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EU Sanctions

EU Sanctions on its Neighbourhood

This article follows the recent analysis of economic sanctions as a coercive tactic and their role in international relations. As part of this topic, the first case study ‘‘US Sanctions on China” examined how sanctions are used in traditional world politics, where governments or global leaders decide to impose sanctions based on their national agendas. It is now time to explore how sanctions are shaped in an intra-state, collective level.

For this analysis, the European Union is selected as the area of study. The reason behind this lies in the particularity or the unique role of the European Union in the global system, which will help us to better understand how sanctions work in the modern politics outside the national boundaries. An in-depth analysis of the reasons is given in the section below. Read more

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France: The movement of ‘Gilets Jaunes’

The announcement of new energy policy measures in France has triggered a public backlash in the mid of November, leading to the birth of the yellow vests (gilets jaunes) movement. The choice of this specific garment is rather symbolic and associated with the legal obligation of all  French motorists to carry with them on their vehicles.

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UK referendum: Exit Scenarios or Renegotiation?

Within the bosom of the European Union, the shift from the European idealism to the Euroscepticism is already a reality. In the UK, this phenomenon has gradually grown within the last three decades as opposed to deeper integration that could threaten British sovereignty (Daddow, 2006).

But what exactly is the phenomenon of Euroscepticism and how does it relate to the UK’s referendum? In the literature, the definition is very ambiguous. Certainly, it represents the voice of those who oppose to further integration that lacks legitimation, but their views vary over the constitutional design for the EU, from intergovernmental to alternative paths of integration with the first option being closer to the UK’s views.

The negative perspective of Britons for the European Union lies in the British history which links back in the 19th century, the era of nationalism in the UK that drew the line between continental Europe and the island (Daddow, 2006). Also, the press held a leading role for nurturing and amplifying an anti-European culture in the UK.

In the most recent history of the UK politics, Euroscepticism reached its peak with the Prime Minister of the Conservative party, Mr David Cameron asking for a referendum in his 2013 EU speech if reelected in the UK general elections of May 2015. Early this month and after a two-day summit in Brussels, he successfully renegotiated with his counterparts the terms of UK’s membership. Now, the say is on the British people who are called to vote with an in/out referendum on 23rd of June 2016.

Why Britain is asking for a referendum now?

To answer this question, it is essential first to understand where Europe currently stands. Second, to address the challenges that threaten European integrity. An accurate overview is given in Rayman & Bremmer’s article, where Europe is represented as a bad formula of countries with “a strong Germany, weak France and absent Britain’’ that restrain the EU from its growth and unity (Rayman and Bremmer, 2015). In addition, the European Union is coping with a Eurozone crisis, a lack of competitiveness in its domestic market in conjunction with political instabilities and the entrance of massive migrant and refugee numbers.

Same reasons were also presented in Cameron’s speech as a justification for the referendum signifying the irrelevance that the UK feels against the EU. Nevertheless, the main objectives of the British negotiations were to protect the country from further political and economic integration and to strengthen the role of the state in the decision-making process within the EU. This is why Cameron suggested a new formula for the EU that will incorporate a flexible network of countries with different levels of integration and cooperation.

In broad terms, the British prime minister has managed to reach a consensus with the European partners in relation to the UK’s claims with some adjustments: a) safeguard the British economy from the Eurozone crisis and the financial centre of City from excessive regulations, b) exclusion of the UK from further integrations, c) reinforcement of the national parliaments’ power to block unwanted legislation, d) refusal in certain migrant benefits such as childcare and migrant welfare payments.

Of course, the negotiations were held within a climate of mutual concessions and disagreements from both sides. Α typical example was the support of the German Chancellor over the cut benefits for the EU nationals that migrate in the UK for the first four years, but characteristically rejected any chance of renegotiating the “fundamental achievements of European integration” (Euractiv.com with AFP, 2016). On the same wavelength, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, agreed on the basis of further EU reforms but opposed to the UK’s practice to stop the social benefits for the EU nationals, since many Hungarians work and live in the UK.

At the same time, Cameron’s proposals get mixed reception not only in Europe but in the UK as well. Some voices within the UK criticized the failure of the new agreement to address the immigration problem or the inability to control Brussels overpower to UK politics. Moreover, his party integrity is already under risk with Conservative MPs divided between the “in and out” options, while the British public appears fairly evenly divided according to the latest opinion polls (BBC News, 2016a).

In the aftermath, one can assume that the real motive behind Cameron’s decision to call a referendum was to pacify the Eurosceptic voices within his country. And this could be attained by renegotiating the terms of the UK’s membership and by obtaining specific exceptions favourable for the UK.

The exit scenario: what if Britons vote “no” in June’s 2016 referendum

Let’s assume that Britons choose to exit the European Union in June’s 2016 referendum. In this case, the European law provides the right for a member state to leave the European Union. According to article 50 of the Treaty of the E.U, a country needs to notify the European Council for its decision to withdraw. Then, negotiations will follow regarding the terms of exit and the future status of the member state with the Union (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). The Treaties shall cease to apply in the country once the agreement has been reached for the withdrawal or failing that, within two years after the notification.

Some interesting insights can be drawn here. First, the UK will have the right to disengage from the EU treaties automatically following the expiry of two years, but this approach will prevent it from securing a post-exit relationship. However, its negotiating power will be amplified, as there will be no interest in satisfying the EU demands. Second, the settlement of a post-exit relationship will be one of the bargaining chips for the EU as this special status could vary from “a free trade arrangement to membership of the European Economic Area or to a new higher form of privileged partnership with the EU” (Nicolaides, 2013).

Yet, with a post-exit agreement or without, the hypothetical withdrawal entails some complexities. The exit procedure will be long and painful with possible disputes from both sides. The UK will be forced to fill in the gaps of the European law or the international agreements (where the EU was the signatory party) with extensive re-legislation. In financial terms, the domestic economy in the UK will meet some difficulties with no more access to a free market and to one of the largest networks of trade agreements in the world, which might also hurt its credibility in the financial market.

Conclusions: Europe needs the UK and vice versa

All these Eurosceptic voices across Europe made it clear to Brussels that reforms need to be made. The rise of the Eurosceptic view is a vital part for the EU democratisation and its examination could help policymakers to extract valuable answers to the questions regarding the sovereignty problems of the EU.

Assuming the UK represents a sceptical country that seeks a different status of membership within the EU, Europe should respect this choice. A European model that incorporates countries with different levels of integration could pave the way to further political integration. The history of the European Union teaches us that economic cooperation and integration evolved by allowing countries to join the European Community or to seek a special economic partnership with the EU, including Norway or Iceland (both part of the European Economic Area -EEA) or Switzerland (a member of the European Free Trade Area -EFTA).

What is clearly understood is that Europe needs the UK and the UK needs Europe. A UK exit equals to a weaker European Union, while for the UK, a future outside the EU will mean no access in the EU decision-making let alone the economic consequences.

Photo: Dave Kellam, Flagging Support (2007). Source: (flickr.com) | (CC BY-SA 2.0)

Bibliography

Bahadir A., Micco P. and Fayos F.G. (2015) The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North, European Parliament, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.3.html (Accessed 22nd February 2016)

BBC News (20/02/2016a) EU referendum: Cameron sets June date for UK vote, Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35621079 (Accessed 22nd February 2016)

BBC News (20/02/2016b) The UK’s EU referendum: All you need to know, Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810887 (Accessed 22nd February 2016)

Daddow J. O. (2006) Euroscepticism and the Culture of the Discipline of History, Review of International Studies, 32 (2): 309-328, Cambridge University Press, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40072140 (Accessed 23th March 2015)

Dave Kellam (2007) Flagging Support, Flickr.com (CC BY-SA 2.0), Available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/davekellam/414918350 (Accessed 25 January 2016)

Euractiv.com with AFP (2016) Cameron Brexit proposals get mixed reception in Berlin and Budapest, Euractiv.com, 7th January 2016, Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/uk-europe/cameron-brexit-proposals-get-mixed-reception-berlin-and-budapest-320783 (Accessed 27th January 2016)

Mark Briggs (2015) As it happened: The UK election, Euractiv.com, 7th May, Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/as-it-happened-the-uk-election/ (Accessed 22 February 2016)

Nicolaides P. (2013) Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A Review of Economic and Legal Complexities, Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings, College of Europe, Available at: https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/beep28_0.pdf (Accessed 21st February 2016)

Official Journal of the European Union (2008) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2008/C 115/01, European Union, Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:FULL&from=EN (Accessed 21st February 2016)

Rayman N. and Bremmer I. (2015) Europe’s Rough Ride, Time, 185 (4): 8-9, Available at: https://www.ebscohost.com (Accessed 23rd March 2015)

The Telegraph (23/01/2013) David Cameron’s EU speech in full, Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/9820230/David-Camerons-EU-speech-in-full.html (Accessed 21st February 2016)

Wilde P. and Trenz H.J. (2012) Denouncing European integration: Euroscepticism as polity contestation, European Journal of Social Theory, 15 (4): 537-554, Available at: http://est.sagepub.com (Accessed 23rd March 2015)

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Serbia: On its journey towards EU membership

The European Union and Serbia began the membership negotiations in December 2015 that will allow Serbia to join the EU in 2020 by opening the first two chapters: Chapter 32 for the financial control and Chapter 35 “Other Issues, Item 1” regarding the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

Out of the most important highlights, it was evident that the full accession of the country in the EU will be a long journey as many reforms are required from the Serbian side. From the EU perspective, a crucial step appears to be the recognition of Kosovo from Serbia for the continuation of the negotiations.

The Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, stated that Serbia’s goal is to fulfil its membership criteria by 2019, while also maintaining the traditionally good relations with Russia.

Towards this direction, the European Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Mr Johannes Hahn, congratulated Serbia’s accomplishments. However, he stressed out that Serbia should focus its efforts on the development of its strategy to reassure an alignment with the EU legislation and that “there is no speed or any other limit, only a certain road which a candidate must navigate through”(Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia, December 2015).

Background

For the first time, the case of Serbia as a potential candidate member was discussed in 2003 during the Thessaloniki European Council summit. In 2012, the country was granted the status of candidacy and one year later, the European Council started the negotiations with Serbia and agreed on the negotiating framework.

Chapter 35 and the normalisation of the Kosovo-Serbia relations

The normalisation of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a top priority set by the EU Enlargement Strategy for good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation.

As specified in paragraph 9 of the EU’s Accession Document for Serbia, the progress in the relations of the latter with Kosovo will be an essential factor for advancing both countries future as full-fledged members of the EU (Conference on Accession to the European Union- Serbia, January 2014). Thus, Serbia is expected to implement all the agreements in the dialogue with Kosovo by resolving any outstanding issues with legal and technical matters as well as by respecting the principles of regional cooperation.

Following the release of the Commission’s staff work document for Serbia’s 2015 Report, it is acknowledged that the mutual engagement of Kosovo and Serbia in the implementation of their agreements had a positive impact on the everyday life of their citizens.

From the EU’s perspective

In the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process of the EU’s Enlargement Policy, many countries of the Western Balkans have been granted the status of EU membership. This region, including Serbia, has been a witness of many recent conflicts and thus an EU membership status has been considered the key for stabilisation and the maintenance of good neighbourly relations.

What’s more, the current refugee crisis with hundreds of thousands of third-country nationals transiting Western Balkans and Turkey urges the need for regional cooperation. Only in Serbia, it is estimated that more than 200,000 refugees entered its territory.

The role of Serbia itself is considered as of great strategic importance for the regional cooperation and for the stability in Western Balkans. With the current recession in Greece and the ongoing migrant crisis, Eric Maurice in his article, published in Euobserver, reiterates that by “anchoring Serbia to the EU has become a geopolitical issue”. (Kosovo agreement clears Serbia’s EU path, EU Observer 2015).

The accession negotiations will be a long journey

Serbia’s accession in the EU will be a long process that “could drag on for years… due to economic crisis and enlargement fatigue in member states” (Eric Maurice; EU Observer, August 2015). Currently, the economic challenges facing the Western Balkan countries will require radical economic reforms in the region: high rate of unemployment, lack of industrialisation, corruption and lack of investment are some examples.

For Serbia, remarkable progress has been made in the financial sector by dropping its unemployment rate and reducing the budget deficit. However, some sectors remain problematic with the publicly owned companies needing further restructure and the private sector further development.

Additionally, the EU’s enlargement policy promotes steady progress in the accession negotiations of each candidate country. As outlined in the Commission’s Communication paper for the EU Enlargement Strategy, “enlargement is a strict but fair process builds on established criteria and lessons learned from the past” and that “each country is assessed on the basis of its own merit”. (EU Enlargement Strategy November 2015).

Photo: Balkan Photos, EU Serbia (2018). Source: (flickr.com) | (CC0 1.0) 

Bibliography

Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia (2015) EU Opens First Chapters within Serbia Membership Negotiations, December 2015, Available at: http://europa.rs/eng/eu-opens-first-chapters-within-serbia-membership-negotiatons/ (Accessed 20 January 2015)

European Commission (2015) Commission Staff Work Document, EU Enlargement Strategy, Serbia 2015 Report, November 2015, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf(Accessed 20 January 2016)

European Commission (2015) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy, November 2015, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf(Accessed 20 January 2016)

European Commission (2015) Serbia, EU Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Countries, 18 December, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/index_en.htm(Accessed 20 January 2016)

European Council (2014) Accession Document, Conference on Accession to the European Union -Serbia, January 2014, Available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=AD%201%202014%20INIT (Accessed 20 January 2016)

European Council (2012) European Council 1/2 March 2012, Conclusions, May 2012, Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/128520.pdf (Accessed 20 January 2016)

Maurice E. (2015) Kosovo agreement clears Serbia’s EU path, Euobserver, 27 August, Available at: https://euobserver.com/enlargement/130008 (Accessed 20 January 2016)

Poznatov M. (2015) Opening of chapters a historic step for Serbia, EurActiv.com, 18 December, Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/enlargement/opening-chapters-historic-step-serbia-320597 (Accessed 20 January 2015)

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